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Abstract 
This paper extends the literature on mixed oligopoly in two directions. First, it introduces distortions in the working of 
the public firm, an issue that is of some concern, especially in transitional economies. Thus the classical model of 
mixed oligopoly emerges as a special case of our formulation. Second, we examine the implementation of the first best 
outcome in the presence of budget balancing. We show that as long as such distortions are not too severe, these do not 
prevent the implementation of the first best outcome with budget balancing, with the first best policy involving a tax on 
the public firm, coupled with subsidies to the private firms. Further, in the absence of any distor tions, implementing 
the first best with budget balancing necessarily involves complete socialization. This shows the importance of budget 
balancing to the applicability of the irrelevance principle. 
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     1. Introduction
In India, a decision to raise tram fares by one paisa by Calcutta Tramways
sparked o violent protests in the 1960s. Very recently, a decision to raise
petrol prices so as to cut down on losses by public sector oil companies created
a furore in the Indian parliament.1 Equally recently, Indian railways reversed
its decision to discontinue certain trains when faced with violent protests in
the aected region. Public sector banks are often not allowed to close down
loss making loan schemes on the grounds that doing so may adversely aect
the common man. Such distortions may also arise internally, if such ideals
are entrenched in the mindsets of the bureaucrats, as well as in the standard
operating procedures in such public rms. All of these goes to make the
point that public rms are often subject to diverse pressures and distortions
in their operations that seek to make these more \consumer friendly".
While our motivating examples are from transitional economies, many of
which have had (and in some cases continue to have), political parties and
electoral groups with socialist sympathies,2 such pulls and pressures may
exist in other economies as well. This is because the very existence of public
rms can perhaps be traced to a perception that protection of consumer
interests in certain industries may require intervention.
This paper adopts an approach that can accommodate both these kinds
of distortions, political as well as bureaucratic, building in such distortions
in the utility function of the public rm itself. Thus formally the utility
function of the public rm is taken to be a weighted average of share-holder
utilities and consumers' surplus. This provides a generalization of the classi-
cal mixed oligopoly model which emerges as a special case when the weight
on consumers' surplus is zero. The focus is on implementing the rst best
outcome in such a setup in the presence of budget-balancing.
We consider a mixed oligopoly with one public, and n private rms. We
begin by analyzing the case where the degree of privatization is exogenously
given, and then use this as a building block to examine the case where the
extent of privatization is endogenously determined.
1In fact, the government has agreed to re-visit this decision in case international oil
prices continue to remain low.
2Even though some of these economies are moving away from their socialist past,
sympathies for socialist ideals remain. In India, for example, privatization of public sector
units is facing rough weather. One of the main reasons for such opposition is that doing
so may hurt the consumers.
1For any exogenously given level of privatization, we demonstrate that a
pure strategy equilibrium exists and moreover any equilibrium involves the
public rm producing more compared to the private rms. Further, as the
public rm becomes more socialistic, in any interior and stable equilibrium,
the output of the public rm increases, and that of the private rms decrease.
We also briey discuss the issue of uniqueness.
The welfare comparison between mixed oligopoly and Cournot competi-
tion however turns out to be ambiguous. Interestingly, the mixed oligopoly
outcome welfare dominates complete privatization whenever the cost func-
tions are not too convex.
We then turn to the question of implementing the rst best when the
government can decide on the extent of socialization of the public rm, say ,
and the tax/subsidies on all rms, private as well as public. We demonstrate
that, as long as the distortions are not too extreme, the rst best outcome
can always be implemented using a policy that involves providing subsidies
to the private rms and a tax on the public rm. Further, this policy turns
out to be budget balancing. Interestingly, in the absence of any distortions,
implementing the rst best with budget balance necessarily involves complete
socialization.
We then briey relate our work to the literature. The early work of
Merrill and Schneider (1966) has been followed by, among others, Cremer
et al. (1989, 1991), De Fraja and Delbono (1989), White (1996), Anderson
et al. (1997), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Myles (2002), Fjell and Heywood
(2002, 2004) and Kato and Tomaru (2007). One of the central issues in the
literature concerns the eect of privatization on welfare. While Cremer at. al.
(1989, 1990) examine the role of public rms as regulatory agents, De Fraja
and Delbono (1989) nds that under certain conditions privatization of the
public rm may be welfare improving. Anderson et al. (1997) demonstrate
the importance of entry decisions and the consumers' love for variety in
making this comparison.
Further, while many of these papers deal with domestic rms, Fjell and
Pal (1996), Fjell and Heywood (2002), Matsumura (2003) and Matsushima
and Matsumura (2006), among others, examine mixed oligopoly with foreign
rms.3 In the present paper though we restrict attention to domestic rms.
We refer the readers to De Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a succinct survey
of the early literature.
3Pal and White (1998) examine strategic trade policy in such a mixed oligopoly context.
2Turning to the literature on mixed oligopoly under partial privatization,
Matsumura (1998) and Matsumura and Kanda (2003) demonstrate that par-
tial privatization is optimal in the short-run, while full nationalisation would
be optimal in the long-run if there is also free entry. Fujiwara (2007) extends
the analysis to the case where there is product dierentiation. Finally, Chao
and Yu (2006) examines partial privatization in the context of optimal trade
policies. None of these papers, however, examine the issue of rst best imple-
mentation with budget balancing. Our analysis shows that when the public
rm can also choose tax/subsidy policies, the rst best can be implemented
even without free entry and with budget balance.
Our analysis also contributes to another branch of the literature, the so
called irrelevance principle. In the presence of welfare maximizing public
rms, the irrelevance principle states that the same non-discriminating sub-
sidy implements the rst best irrespective of whether there is privatization
or not (see e.g. White (1996), Poyago-Theotoky (2001), Myles (2002), Fjell
and Heywood (2004) and Kato and Tomaru (2007)). In fact, Tomaru (2006)
demonstrates that the irrelevance principle holds even under partial priva-
tization. For the case where there are no distortions, we nd that the rst
best can be implemented with budget balancing if and only if the public rm
is welfare maximizing. Thus whether the irrelevance principle holds or not
depends on whether one insists on budget balance or not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model,
while the case with exogenously given  is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4
solves for the problem of implementing the rst best, as well as relates our
results to the irrelevance principle. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2. The Model
There are n prot-maximizing private rms and one public rm, all pro-
ducing a homogeneous good. The output of the i-th private rm is denoted
qi and that of the public rm is q0, so that aggregate output Q = q0+
Pn
1 qi.
The inverse demand function is f(Q). Firms are symmetric with the cost
function of all rms, including the public rm, being c(q).
Assumption 1. (i) The inverse demand f : (0;1) ! [0;1) and
9 ^ Q; 0 < ^ Q < 1; such that f(Q) > 0 if 0  Q < ^ Q, and f(Q) = 0
if Q  ^ Q. Further, f(Q) is twice dierentiable, decreasing and (weakly)
concave, i.e. f0(Q) < 0 and f00(Q)  0, for all Q such that ^ Q > Q > 0.
3(ii) The cost function c : [0;1) ! [0;1) is twice dierentiable, increasing
and convex, i.e. c0(qi) > 0 and c00(qi) > 0; 8qi  0. Also, c(0) = c0(0) = 0.
The assumption that f00(Q)  0 implies that the second order conditions
for the private rms are satised. Assumption 2 below ensures that the
corresponding condition holds for the public rm.
Assumption 2. f0(Q)   (Q   q)f00(Q)   c00(q) < 0, 8Q  q > 0.
One sucient condition (given that f00(Q)  0), for A2 to hold is that the
marginal demand function, f0(Q), is elastic, i.e.
f0(Q)=Q
f00(Q)  1: A2 also holds if
the demand function is linear.
The prot function of the i-th rm is given by
i = qif(Q)   c(qi); i = 0;1; ;n: (1)












f(q)dq   Qf(Q): (3)
We next turn to the task of formulating the utility function of the public
rm where the government holds a share of  in the public rm, with 1   
shares being held privately. Thus, with a welfare maximizing government,
the average utility of the two groups of shareholders, the government and the
private agents, is
W + (1   )0: (4)
Following our earlier discussion we then add another layer of complexity
to allow for bureaucratic and political distortions in the workings of public
rms. This is formalized by a utility function, P, that is a weighted average
of share-holder utilities (as expressed in (4)) and consumers' surplus
P = [W + (1   )0] + D()CS; (5)
4where D(), denotes the weight on consumers' surplus. D() satises the
following reasonable restrictions.
Assumption 3.
(i) D : [0;1] ! [0;1] is once dierentiable with D0()  0.
(ii) D()  1    and D0()   1.
A3(i) captures the idea that as the extent of privatization increases, this
may unleash countervailing forces seeking to correct for an anticipated loss of
consumers' surplus. In order to concentrate on the case of interest, we assume
that such distortions cannot be too large. This is formalized in A3(ii). Note
that the case where there is no distortion, i.e. D() = 0 8, emerges as a
special case.
This formulation of P, placing an weight on consumers' surplus, has some
similarities to Matsumura (1998), who also allows for an additional weight
of  (possibly zero), on consumers' surplus. The dierence with this paper
is twofold. First, in Matsumura (1998), this additional weight enters the
government's objective function, whereas in the present paper it appears
as a distortion of the shareholders' objective. Second, unlike in Matsumura
(1998) this paper allows for the possibility that weight on consumers' surplus
could depend on the extent of privatization.
We consider a mixed oligopoly game where the rms simultaneously de-
cide on their output levels. In the next section we solve for the pure strategy
Nash equilibrium of the game where  is exogenously given. In Section 4,
we solve for the game where the government can select  so as to maximize
welfare.
3. The Mixed Oligopoly Game
For expositional purposes, we adopt a specic functional form for D(),
namely 1    in this section. Note that this satises A3. Further we shall
see in Section 4 that this functional form has an interesting interpretation.
With this simplication, the utility of the public rm is
P = q0f(Q)   c(q0) +
Z Q
0




where   1. It is thus a weighted sum of its own prots and consumers
surplus, and the aggregate prot of the private rms.
5We rst dene the rst best outcome, i.e. the output vector that max-






At this output vector, price equals marginal cost for every rm. Given A1,
q is well dened. Let Q = (n + 1)q.
Before proceeding further let us solve for the benchmark case of Cournot
competition with private rms. This is of particular interest since Cournot
competition can be interpreted as arising out of privatizing the public rm.
Cournot competition: There are n + 1 prot-maximizing rms who




It is standard to show that there is a unique Cournot equilibrium4 where
all rms produce an output level of qC (> 0) where qC is the unique solution
to f((n+1)q)+qf0((n+1)q) = c0(q). Let Qc = (n+1)qc. Clearly, Qc < Q.




n), with the aggregate output being denoted by Q0.
First note that in any equilibrium all private rms have the same output,
q0.5 Further, in equilibrium q0 > 0.6 Consequently, the rst order condition
of the private rms is given by
f(q0 + nq) + qf
0(q0 + nq) = c
0(q): (9)
Let q0 = g(q), where g(q) solves (9) when a solution exists,7 otherwise let
g(q) = 0. From A1, g(q) is decreasing in q. Further, g(0) = ^ Q > 0 (since
c0(0) = 0) and there exists q00 which is the smallest q such that g(q) = 0.8
4See, e.g. Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987).
5Suppose to the contrary, q0
i > q0
j  0 for some i 6= j. Since q0
i > 0, q0
if0(Q0) + f(Q0)  
c0(q0




i) = 0, where the rst
inequality follows from the fact that q0
i > q0
j, f0(Q) < 0 and c00(q) > 0. Thus the j-th rm
has an incentive to increase its output, contradiction. Hence q0
i = q0 for all i  1.
6Suppose to the contrary q0 = 0, so that Q0 = q0
0. Then, from the public rm's rst
order condition, the equilibrium q0
0 solves f(q0
0) = c0(q0
0) > 0. Since c0(0) = 0, for qi small,
qif0(q0
0) + f(q0
0)   c0(qi) > 0, so that the i-th private rm has an incentive to increase its
output.
7From A1, if (9) has a solution for q0, it is unique.
8Such a q00 exists since, for q = ^ Q=n, the LHS of (9) is less than the RHS, 8q0.








0(Q) = 0: (10)
Using symmetry, the above condition simplies to
f(q0 + nq)   c
0(q0)   nqf
0(q0 + nq)(1   ) = 0: (11)
From (11) one can write q0 = h(q). From A1, h(q) is well dened for all
q. Further, h(0) solves f(q0) = c0(q0), so that h(0) < g(0).
First note that since h(q) is well dened, 8q, g(q) and h(q) necessarily
intersects so that an equilibrium exists. Further, if h(q00) > 0, then an interior
equilibrium exists. Next using the rst order conditions of the private rms,




0(Q)[1 + n(1   )] = 0: (12)
From (12), in any equilibrium q0 > q. Finally, note that as the public rm
becomes more socialistic, i.e.  decreases, h(q) shifts upwards. Thus, in any
stable equilibrium the output of the public rm q0() increases, and that of
the private rms q() decreases.
Summarizing the above discussion we have
Proposition 1 Suppose A1-A2 hold and D() = 1   .
(i) An equilibrium exists. Further, an interior equilibrium exists whenever
h(q00) > 0.
(ii) In any equilibrium, all private rms produce the same output, say q0.
Further, the output level of the public rm exceeds that of the private rms,
i.e. q0.
(iii) As the public rm becomes more socialistic, i.e.  decreases, in any
stable interior equilibrium, the output level of the public rm increases, and
that of the private rms decrease.10
Note that Proposition 1 says nothing about uniqueness. In what follows
we impose the following assumption (or an appropriately modifed version
thereof), which ensures that a unique interior equilibrium exists.
9Note that for q0 small, the LHS of (10) is strictly positive. Thus any equilibrium must
involve a positive output for the public rm.
10It is easy to check that Proposition 1 goes through for any D() satisfying A3.
7Assumption 4.
(i) For any ~ q satisfying g(q) = h(q), h0(~ q) > g0(~ q).
(ii) h(q00) > 0, where q00 is the smallest q such that g(q) = 0.11
Remark 1. We then argue that for linear demand and quadratic costs
the equilibrium is necessarily unique. Suppose that there is one public rm
(rm 0) and one private rm (rm 1). We assume that the demand func-
tion is a   q0   q1 and the cost function is cq2
i=2;i = 0;1. Under mixed
oligopoly, it is easy to check that h(q) and g(q) are both negatively sloped,




(1+c)(2+c)  and q0 = ac
(1+c)(2+c) : It is straightforward to generalize the
argument to the case with n  2 private rms.
3.1. Welfare Analysis
In this sub-section we compare the welfare level under mixed oligopoly
with that under Cournot competition.
To begin with note that while the rst best outcome is symmetric, the
mixed oligopoly one is not. This immediately implies that the mixed oligopoly
outcome is sub-optimal.
As to comparing welfare under mixed oligopoly with that under Cournot
competition, there are two opposing eects at work here. First, because of the
presence of the public rm, aggregate output, and consequently consumers'
surplus, tends to be larger under a mixed oligopoly. On the other hand,
there is an eciency loss arising out of the fact that the output levels are
asymmetric, so that aggregate prot under mixed oligopoly is likely to be
less than that under Cournot competition. Thus, depending on parameter
values, either eect may dominate, hence the ambiguity.
We start by comparing the consumers' surplus (i.e. the aggregate output)
under the two regimes. Clearly, the Cournot equilibrium is dened by the
intersection of g(q) with the 45 degree line. Next recall that the mixed
oligopoly involves q0
0 > q0, so that it lies above the 45 degree line. Hence,
q0










11Uniqueness follows from the continuity of g(q) and h(q), and the fact that in case of
multiple intersections, h0(q)  g0(q) at one of these intersections.
8Since q0 < qC, from (13) it follows that the aggregate output level is higher
under a mixed oligopoly. This immediately implies that the consumers' sur-
plus is higher compared to that under Cournot competition.
Proposition 2 Suppose A1, A2 and A4 hold and D() = 1   . Aggregate
output, and consequently consumers' surplus, under mixed oligopoly exceeds
that under Cournot competition. Moreover, if the marginal cost is (weakly)
convex, then aggregate output under mixed oligopoly is less than that under
the rst best.
Proof. Consider the second part of the proposition. Multiplying (9) by n











0(Q) = 0: (14)










) > 0: (15)






) = 0: (16)
Given that f(Q) c0(
Q
n+1) is decreasing in Q, from (15) and (16), Q0 < Q.
Remark 2. In case the public rm is fully privatized, it is straightforward
to show that a converse result holds: If  = 0 and the marginal cost is
concave, then aggregate output under mixed oligopoly is greater than that
under the rst best.
We then compare the welfare level under mixed oligopoly with that under
Cournot competition. For suciently convex cost functions, it is well known
from De Fraja and Delbono (1989) that the eciency loss eect is large and
dominates the output eect, so that welfare levels under a mixed oligopoly
tends to be lower than that under privatization. We next provide an example
to show that the converse is also true, in that if the cost functions are not
9too convex then welfare under a mixed oligopoly may be higher than that
under complete privatization.
Remark 3. Consider the example discussed in Remark 1 earlier with one
public and one private rm, demand function a   q0   q1 and cost function
cq2





(1+c)(2+c) : It is straightforward to check that W 0, the equilibrium
welfare level under mixed oligopoly, goes to a2=2 as c goes to zero. Whereas
under Cournot oligopoly, we obtain qC
i = a
3+c and W C =
(4+c)a2
(3+c)2 , where qC
i is
the equilibrium output of rm i and W C is the equilibrium welfare level. As
c goes to zero, W C goes to 4a2=9 < a2=2. For c small, the cost functions are
not too convex, hence the eciency loss arising out of asymmetric output is
not too large, so that the consumers' surplus eect dominates.
4. Implementing the First Best with Budget-balancing
In examining the issue of rst best implementation with budget-balancing,
we shall argue that the exact form of D() plays a crucial role. We thus revert
to a general D() satisfying A3.
The government maximizes aggregate welfare, i.e. the sum of consumers'
surplus and prots, using a policy-tuple < ;s0;s >, where  2 [0;1] denotes
the extent of socialization, s0 denotes the tax/subsidy on the public rm and s
denotes the tax/subsidy on the private rms. Note that we restrict attention
to simple linear schedules. For one, this simplies implementation of such
policies. Further, this makes tax/subsidy policies transparent, reducing the
scope of bureaucratic corruption and harassment.
We consider a two stage model.
Stage 1. The government selects some mechanism < ;s0;s >, so as to
maximize welfare.
Stage 2. The rms play a simultaneous move quantity-setting game where
every rm maximizes its own objective, with the rm objectives clearly de-
pending on the selected mechanism.
From (5), the utility function of the public rm is
W + (1   )[q0f(Q)   c(q0) + t:q0] + D()[
Z Q
0
f(q)dq   Qf(Q)]: (17)




+ (1      D())[q0f






0(Q) + (1   )s0 = 0: (18)
We then characterizes conditions under which the rst best may be im-
plementable with budget balancing.
Proposition 3 Let A1-A3 and an appropriately modied version of A4 hold.
For any , the rst best outcome with budget-balancing is implementable if
and only if D() = 1   . Further, the rst best policy involves a per unit
tax on the public rm, so that s0 = nqf0(Q), and a per unit subsidy of
s =  qf0(Q) to the private rms.
Proof. Fix  = 0.
Suciency. Let D(0) = 1 0 and further let the tax/subsidy policy be
as prescribed. To show that given that all other rms are producing q, it is





0(qi) + s = 0: (19)
Clearly, given that s =  qf0(Q) and (7), qi = q solves the above equation.
Next consider the public rm. Consider (18). Given that all other rms
are producing at q, q0 = q ensures that @W
@q0 = 0. Thus the rst order













) + (1   )s0














) = 0: (20)
Given D(0) = 1   0, this is indeed true.
Necessity. The FOC for the private rm imply that implementing the
rst best must involve, s =  qf0(Q). Consequently, budget balancing
must involve s0 = nqf0(Q). Thus the FOC for the public rm implies that
(20) must hold. Given that Qf0(Q) < 0, this implies that D(0) = 1 0.
Given Proposition 3, it is easy to see that the rst best can necessarily be
implemented. This follows since from the continuity of D(), there is some
110 such that D(0) = 1   0. This of course is subject to the qualication
that these distortions are not too large, as formalized in A3.
Summarizing we have
Corollary 1. A mechanism implementing the rst best with budget bal-
ance exists.
We then use Proposition 3 to analyze some special cases of interest.
First consider the case where the distortions arise out of political pres-
sures. Assuming that political parties respond to high visibility indicators
like the extent of privatization, such political opposition is likely to be small
whenever the public rm is completely socialized. This can be approximated
as D(1) = 0, so that the distortions vanish for  = 1. In that case the opti-
mal policy involves complete socialization, i.e.  = 1. It is interesting that
with a welfare maximizing public rm the rst best can be implemented with
budget balancing, especially in view of the fact that the literature emphasizes
that in this case a uniform subsidy implements the rst best.
Next consider the case where there is no distortion so that D() = 0 8,
which is the case that the literature has largely focused on. From Proposition
3, the optimal policy involves  = 1, i.e. a welfare maximizing public rm.
This shows that if one insists on budget balancing, then implementing the
rst best, even in the absence of any distortions, involves complete socializa-
tion. To reiterate, the rst best is not implementable under privatization,
either complete or partial, whenever one insists on budget balancing. This
demonstrates the importance of budget-balancing to the applicability of the
irrelevance principle.
Summarizing the preceding discussion we have the following corollary.
Corollary 2.
(i) Even in the presence of distortions, there exists an optimal level of
socialization , satisfying D() = 1   , such that the rst best can be
implemented with budget balance.
(ii) With a welfare maximizing public rm, the rst best can be imple-
mented with budget balance whenever D(1) = 0, which is likely if, for exam-
ple, the distortions are political in nature.
(iii) In the absence of any distortions, i.e. D() = 0 8, implementing
the rst best with budget balance necessarily involves complete socialization.
125. Conclusion
This paper extends the literature on mixed oligopoly in two directions.
First, it introduces distortions in the working of the public rm, an issue that
is of some concern, especially in transitional economies. This constitutes a
generalization of the classical model of mixed oligopoly, with the classical
model emerging as a special case of our formulation. Second, we examine
the implementation of the rst best outcome in the presence of budget bal-
ancing, an issue that his been relatively unexplored in the literature. We
show that as long as such distortions are not too severe, these do not prevent
the implementation of the rst best outcome with budget balancing, with the
rst best policy involving a tax on the public rm, coupled with subsidies to
the private rms. Further, in the absence of any distortions, implementing
the rst best with budget balancing necessarily involves complete socializa-
tion. This shows the importance of budget balancing to the applicability of
the irrelevance principle.
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